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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4173 
_____________ 
 
 
MICHAEL J. MANDELBROT; MANDELBROT LAW FIRM, 
 
              Appellants 
 
v. 
 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY 
SETTLEMENT TRUST; BABCOCK & WILCOX ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY 
SETTLEMENT TRUST; OWENS CORNING/FIBREBOARD ASBESTOS 
PERSONAL INJURY TRUST; FEDERAL MOGUL ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY 
TRUST; UNITED STATES GYPSUM ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY 
SETTLEMENT TRUST; CELOTEX ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT TRUST 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(District Court No.:  1-13-cv-01032) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
       
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 9, 2015 
 
 
(Opinion filed: October 15, 2015) 
 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, NYGAARD, RENDELL Circuit Judges 
 
2 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Michael J. Mandelbrot, Esq., and the Mandelbrot Law Firm (collectively, 
“Mandelbrot”) appeal from the District Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss of 
Appellees Armstrong World Industries Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 
Babcock & Wilcox Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust, Owens 
Corning/Fibreboard Asbestos Personal Injury Trust, Federal Mogul Asbestos Personal 
Injury Trust, United States Gypsum Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust, and 
Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust (collectively, “the Delaware Trusts”).  The District 
Court dismissed Mandelbrot’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that 
Mandelbrot lacked Article III standing because there was no injury in fact.  We will 
affirm.   
The Delaware Trusts were formed to pay personal injury claims resulting from 
exposure to asbestos in products manufactured by companies that had filed for 
bankruptcy.  Mandelbrot specializes in preparing and filing claims with settlement trusts.  
He has submitted over 13,000 claims on behalf of asbestos claimants to asbestos trusts, 
including over 2,200 claims to the Delaware Trusts.  In October 2012, the Delaware 
Trusts suspended payment of claims from claimants whom Mandelbrot represented 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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pending further review of claims that he had submitted.1  This decision stemmed from 
adversarial proceedings in California regarding allegedly fraudulent claims that 
Mandelbrot had submitted to asbestos trusts in California.  The Delaware Trusts also 
asked Mandelbrot to pay the expected costs of auditing claims from his firm, but he 
refused.       
Mandelbrot then filed this suit alleging that the Delaware Trusts’ refusal to process 
claims from his firm was harming claimants and, by extension, causing him financial 
losses.  He sought a declaratory judgment proclaiming that the Delaware Trusts’ decision 
to suspend his claims was unauthorized and in violation of the Trusts’ respective 
Distribution Procedures.2  He also sought an injunction ordering the Delaware Trusts to 
process his claims and pay the costs of the audit. 
The District Court dismissed Mandelbrot’s suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because he had not suffered an injury in fact.  It held that adverse actions 
taken by a trust do not create legally cognizable injuries for non-beneficiary plaintiffs and 
that Mandelbrot’s indirect interest in attorney’s fees was insufficient to create an injury in 
fact.  It also held that the Distribution Procedures did not create an implied contractual 
relationship that would confer standing upon Mandelbrot.   
                                              
1 The Delaware Trusts continued to permit Mandelbrot to file new claims via physical, 
hard copies in order to avoid any statutes of limitations problems for the claimants, but 
Mandelbrot was suspended from using the Delaware Trusts’ electronic claim filing 
system.   
2 The Delaware Trusts all have Distribution Procedures to guide claimants in filing their 
claims.   
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We agree that Mandelbrot has not suffered an injury in fact.  A mandatory element 
of constitutional standing is that “the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact,” Joint 
Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001), which is “an invasion 
of a legally protected interest,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).   
Only claimants themselves, not the claimants’ representatives, have standing to 
assert legally cognizable claims against a trust.  In other words, “[n]o one except a 
beneficiary or one suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce 
the trust or to enjoin or obtain redress for a breach of trust.”  Sergeson v. Del. Trust Co., 
413 A.2d 880, 882 (Del. 1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200 (1959)); 
see also In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 47, 64-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(collecting cases and describing “bedrock rule” that “only the beneficiary or trustee of an 
express trust has standing to sue to establish and enforce the trust”). 
  Mandelbrot argues that he has standing because of lost fees that he would have 
realized by representing claimants pursuing claims against the Delaware Trusts.  The loss 
of any attorney’s fees that Mandelbrot might have received is insufficient to create an 
injury in fact.  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71 (1986) (The loss of a potential 
fee award “does not mean that the injury is cognizable under Art. III.”). 
Mandelbrot also argues that the Delaware Trusts’ Distribution Procedures and 
Electronic Filing Agreements created an implied contractual relationship, but these 
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arguments lack merit.  These documents outline procedures for filing claims; they do not 
confer rights upon claimants’ representatives.3   
We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
                                              
3 Because Mandelbrot lacks standing, we need not address his argument, which he raises 
for the first time on appeal, that there is no diversity jurisdiction.  We can address 
threshold jurisdictional orders in any sequence:  “While . . . subject-matter jurisdiction 
necessarily precedes a ruling on the merits, the same principle does not dictate a 
sequencing of jurisdictional issues.”  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 
584 (1999). 
